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ABSTRACT 
Cory Louis Breaux:  Democracy on the Ballot: Direct Democracy in California and the United 
Kingdom 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
This essay compares direct democratic institutions between two cases:  ballot initiatives 
in California, and elite-controlled referendums in the United Kingdom (UK).  The relationship 
between direct democratic institutions and Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensus models of 
democracy is outlined in relation to the two cases, additionally considering the impact that these 
institutions can have on voter choice and deliberation in democratic states.  The essay finds that 
though the direct democratic institutions of California and the UK are markedly different, neither 
functions as an entirely majoritarian or entirely consensual device; instead, the institutional 
features would appear to function as an additional dimension of democracy, in line with Vatter 
and Bernauer’s (2009) suggestion.  Further, direct democratic institutions in both cases also 
present opportunities for negative impacts on voter choice and the deliberative democratic 
process. 
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INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 
Introduction 
While all democratic governments share a common belief in what Abraham Lincoln 
described as a “government not only by but for the people,” the precise institutional details of 
such a government vary greatly between democracies (Lijphart 2012, 1).  One such institutional 
variation lies in the inclusion of direct democratic institutions in the political process – while 
some democracies have created institutions that give the final and exclusive decision-making 
power to elected legislatures, others have chosen to give citizens direct input in the legislative 
process (Qvortrup 2013).  These institutions have taken a number of forms, including advisory 
referendums, ballot initiatives and legislative vetoes (Gregorczuk 1998). 
Though some European states have codified direct democratic institutions and make 
frequent use of them, referendums have become increasingly common on an ad-hoc basis in 
states that do not have a long-established tradition of direct democratic institutions.  In particular, 
ballot questions relating to EU policy issues and EU treaties “have become the norm” across 
Western Europe, as lawmakers have turned to their constituents to seek consent for actions taken 
at the European level (Kaufmann 2004, 3).  At both the domestic and supranational level, 
political elites have increasingly utilized referendums as a “safety valve for releasing popular 
pressure” in the face of the rise of populist politics1 across Europe, which can be seen as a 
reflection of an increasing dissatisfaction in political institutions both at the national and 
                                               
1 For the scope of this essay, I will use populist politics to refer to the emergence of a political movement that 
emphasizes a “distinction between “the people” and “the elite” as an intrinsic characteristic of politics, and they 
argue that the interests of the people are more authentic and have greater legitimacy” (Stanley 2013, 642).  
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European level (S. B. Hobolt 2012, Topaloff 2017, 127).  In particular, during 2016, multiple 
high-profile referendums occurred that fundamentally changed the European political landscape, 
the most notable example of which was British voters electing to leave the EU in June of that 
year. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, direct democracy has played a significant role in the 
American political system.  The country’s founders, fearing that “unrestrained majorities could 
become a mob and be as great a threat to liberty as any tyrant,” did not include any direct 
democratic institutions at the national level (Bailey 2015, 4).  Beginning largely in the 
Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century, some individual states have chosen to 
include various direct democratic institutions.  One of the most well-studied examples of 
American direct democratic institutions is the state of California, which has some of the most 
robust direct democratic institutions in the country (Braunstein 2004). 
Though direct democratic institutions can be considered a strategy used by governments 
to give citizens greater influence in the political arena, they are inherently majoritarian by nature, 
and may serve to limit the input of minority groups on the political process, and craft a system 
that is less consensus-based and more majoritarian (Lijphart 2012). 
Considering the diversity of direct democratic institutions in both Europe and the US, it is 
important to consider how these variations impact the political process.  This essay will consider 
various features of referendums and direct democracy, using the UK and California – two 
governments with starkly different direct democratic institutions – as case studies to raise 
questions of how these institutions impact the political process. 
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Majoritarian and Consensus Models of Democracy 
In his book Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart analyzes democratic institutions 
across 36 different countries, and determines that there are ten major institutional differences 
between these states, clustered into “two clearly separate dimensions” – the executives-parties 
dimension and the federal-unitary dimension (Figure 1) (2012, 3).  Using these two dimensions, 
Lijphart argues that democratic governments can then be categorized as following either a 
majoritarian (also called Westminster) model or a consensus model of democracy (Ibid.).  
The Westminster model – named after the Palace of Westminster, the meeting place of 
the “original and best-known example” of the model, the Parliament of the UK – has been 
adopted and imitated by a number of democracies, including “most of Britain’s former colonies 
in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean,” as well as Australia, Canada and New Zealand after their 
independence, a set of states totaling approximately 40 percent of people living in democracies 
(Dewan and Spirling 2011, Lijphart 2012, 9-10).  Though institutional details differ between 
specific cases, according to Lijphart, there are ten primary features of the model, five along the 
executives-parties dimension:  1) concentration of executive power in one-party and bare 
majority cabinets, 2) cabinet dominance (vis-à-vis Parliament), 3) a two-party system, 4) 
majoritarian and disproportional system of elections, 5) interest group pluralism; and five along 
the federal-unitary dimension:  1) unitary and centralized government, 2) concentration of 
legislative power in a unicameral legislature, 3) constitutional flexibility, 4) absence of judicial 
review, and 5) a central bank controlled by the executive (2012).  As a result of these features, in 
a majoritarian democracy, control of the legislature by a single party results in “the maximum 
potential for policy change,” because in order to modify the status quo, agreement is only needed 
from that one party (Strohmeier 2015, 306, Tsebelis 2002).  The tradeoff to the nature of high 
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potential for policy change is that the majoritarian model has “low potential for policy 
consensus,” and even the possibility of “elective dictatorship” where the policy goals of the 
minority are ignored completely (Hailsham 1978, Strohmeier 2015, 313). 
 
Figure 1: Lijphart’s dimensions of democracy  
Dimension Variable Majoritarian 
democracy 
Consensus 
democracy 
Executive-parties Party system Two-party system Multi-party system 
Cabinets Single-party majority 
cabinets 
Power-sharing multi-
party coalitions 
Executive-legislative 
relationship 
Dominant executive Executive-legislative 
balance of power 
Electoral system Disproportional first-
past-the-post system 
Proportional 
representation 
Interest groups Informal pluralist 
interest group 
interaction 
Coordinated and 
‘corporatist’ interest 
group interaction 
Federal-unitary Federal unitary 
dimension 
Unitary and 
centralized 
government 
Federal and 
decentralized 
government 
Unicameralism-
bicameralism 
dimension 
Concentration of 
power in a 
unicameral 
legislature 
Division of power 
between two equally 
strong but differently 
constituted houses 
Constitutional 
amendment 
Flexible constitution 
that can be amended 
by simple majorities 
Rigid constitutions 
that can be changed 
only by extraordinary 
majorities 
Legislative 
supremacy 
Legislature has the 
final word on the 
constitutionality of 
legislation 
Legislation subject to 
a judicial review of 
their constitutionality 
by a supreme or 
constitutional court 
Central bank Dependent on the 
executive 
Independent central 
bank 
Adapted from Matthews (2011), Lijphart (2012) 
 
Despite being considered a prototypical example of the Westminster model, in the 
aftermath of the “most radical programme of constitutional reform” in nearly a century, there has 
been debate over whether or not the UK can still be considered the foremost example of the 
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Westminster model – or whether it still fits the model at all (Bogdanor 2001, 143, Strohmeier 
2015).  The (failed) referendum proposing the UK switch from a first-past-the-post system to an 
alternative vote system in 2011, as well as the devolution of powers in the UK from Westminster 
to the constituent nations of North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have been notable recent shifts 
away from the majoritarian archetype that the Westminster system is purported to be (Qvortrup 
2012).  Strohmeier observes that though these reforms, coupled with electoral results, have led to 
a shift towards greater consensus on both dimensions, both he and Lijphart agree that “the 
contemporary Westminster system is still a majoritarian one” (Lijphart 2012, Strohmeier 2015, 
313). 
The second model of democracy identified by Lijphart is the consensus model of 
democracy, which challenges the majoritarian idea that “majorities should govern and minorities 
should oppose” (2012, 30).  This model is frequently used in heterogeneous democracies, 
“emphasizes consensus instead of opposition,” and is exemplified in the governmental 
institutions of Switzerland, Belgium at the national level, and the EU at the supranational level 
(Lijphart 2012, 32).  For consensus model democracies, Lijphart identifies ten characteristics 
along the two dimensions, all of which contrast sharply with those of majoritarian democracies 
(Ibid.).  Along the executive-parties dimension: 1) executive power-sharing in broad coalition 
cabinets, 2) executive-legislative balance of power, 3) multiparty systems, 4) proportional 
representation, and 5) interest group corporatism; and along the federal-unitary dimension: 1) 
federal and decentralized government, 2) strong bicameralism, 3) constitutional rigidity, 4) 
judicial review, and 5) central bank independence.  Unlike the majoritarian system, because there 
are larger numbers of so-called veto players and “high degree of consensus” is needed for 
legislation to pass through the policymaking process, there is often less potential to change the 
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status quo in consensus systems; each individual party acts as a veto player, which is then 
compounded by the presence of the bicameral legislative system that typically characterizes 
consensus models (Fischer 2014, 357, Tsebelis 2002). 
It is important to point out that the models in Lijphart’s typology are not entirely 
mutually exclusive, and particular governments may have institutions that are a mixture of the 
two models.  For instance, as discussed earlier, many aspects of the UK’s model of majoritarian 
democracy have shifted towards the consensus model in recent years (Matthews 2011, 
Strohmeier 2015).  Another example of mixed institutions is the US, where a strong federal 
system with a bicameral legislature, rigid constitution and robust judicial review exists alongside 
a two-party system with a strong executive, single-party majority cabinets, and a first-past-the-
post voting system.  Using quantitative measurements of the ten variables, Lijphart is able to 
produce a two-dimensional map of the democratic models, showing the diversity and nuance of 
democratic institutions (Figure 2).  In the figure, the horizontal axis represents executives-parties 
dimension, and the vertical represents the federal-unitary dimension, where high values indicate 
consensus and low values indicate majoritarianism, with each unit being one standard deviation 
from the mean score (Lijphart 2012). 
Given the respective features of majoritarian and consensus democracies, conventional 
wisdom would suggest that “majoritarian democracy is better at governing… [while] consensus 
democracy is better at representing – in particular, representing minority groups and minority 
interests” (Lijphart 2012, 274).  Lijphart, however, demonstrates that – in terms of economic 
measurements – there is only a small difference between the performance of the two models, 
meaning that “the conventional wisdom is clearly wrong in claiming that majoritarian 
democracies are better governors” (2012, 273).  Furthermore, Lijphart finds that consensus 
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democracies perform better than their majoritarian counterparts in terms of representation and 
what he describes as “the kindness and gentleness of their public policy orientations” – referring 
to social welfare, environmental protections, criminal justice and foreign aid (2012, 288, 295).  
The federalist institutions of consensus democracies, according to Lijphart, also have “obvious 
advantages for large countries and for countries with deep religious and ethnic divisions” (2012, 
295). 
Figure 2: Two-dimensional conceptual map of democratic models2 
Source: Lijphart (2012, 234) 
 
In addition to the differences in policy outcomes between majoritarian and consensus 
democracies, the two systems have varying effects on how their citizens perceive democracy.  
Norris observes that democratic institutions, by their very nature, “consistently rule some groups 
                                               
2 Countries are labelled according to the first three characters of their English names, with the following exceptions:  
AUL – Australia; AUT – Austria; CR – Costa Rica; JPN – Japan; NZ – New Zealand; UK – United Kingdom; US – 
United States. 
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into, and some groups out of, the decision-making process,” and as a result, there is a link 
between electoral success, satisfaction and institutional confidence (1999, 234).  Institutional 
confidence is, in turn, linked to positive policy outcomes, institutional stability, and government 
performance (Miller and Listhaug 1999, Norris 1999).  Accordingly, Anderson and Guillory 
demonstrate a link between the institutional model and the level of satisfaction amongst their 
citizens: 
We find that people on the losing side in an electoral competition show lower 
levels of satisfaction with the system than do those on the winning side. 
Moreover, there is an interaction between the institutional environment and a 
person's status as part of the political majority or minority. Losers in systems that 
are more consensual display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy 
works than do losers in systems with majoritarian characteristics.  Conversely, 
winners tend to be more satisfied with democracy the more a country's political 
institutions approximate pure majoritarian government. (1997, 66) 
 
This link between institutional model and citizen satisfaction is further investigated by 
Bernauer and Vatter, who find that the correlation between citizen satisfaction and model of 
democracy based on Lijphart’s dimensions is relatively modest (2012).  Consequently, they 
propose the addition of an additional dimension for analysis, the cabinets-direct democracy 
dimension, based on the presence of “consensual direct democracy” and varying with cabinet 
type (Bernauer and Vatter 2012, 459, Vatter and Bernauer, 2009).  Based on their analysis, 
Bernauer and Vatter (2012) determine that an institutional dimension based on direct democracy 
may play a larger role in satisfaction than either the federal-unitary or executive-parties 
dimensions. 
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Types of Referendums and Models of Democracy 
The findings that referendums may increase citizen satisfaction in the same manner that a 
consensus-based democracy does goes against the conventional wisdom that referendums are the 
“most extreme majoritarian method of decision-making” in a democracy (Lijphart 2012, 221).  
Since they (typically) only offer a binary choice, referendums are unable to “measure intensities 
or beliefs or work things out through discussion and discovery… [and can] be more dangerous 
than representative assemblies to minority rights” (Butler and Ranney 1978, 36).  Nevertheless, it 
is possible, as Marxer and Pállinger observe, for referendums to be used in fostering consensus 
“when they have an anti-majoritarian character,” which typically occurs when the referendum is 
initiated by “those representing minority views,” or if a referendum can be used for “putting a 
brake on the political decision-making process” (2009, 35).  Lijphart agrees, observing that for 
constitutional amendments in particular, referendums are an opportunity for dissatisfied 
minorities “to launch a campaign against the proposed amendment” (2012, 221). 
In order to delineate in which circumstances referendums act as a majoritarian or 
consensus based device, and to facilitate their analysis of direct democracy as an additional 
dimension of democratic institutions, Vatter and Bernauer establish a typology of referendums, 
ranging from high to low “governmental control” (2009, 338).  Plebiscites exist at the high 
control end of the spectrum, where the ruling government is able to control both the agenda and 
initiation of the referendum, are called in situations where a decision is sent “to the people to win 
a new mandate for a controversial policy,” and can only be triggered by ruling majorities 
(Qvortrup 2014, 53, Vatter and Bernauer, 2009).  On the opposite end of this spectrum are 
popular initiatives – “voters’ propositions for laws or constitutional reforms” – and optional 
referendums – intended to “overturn decisions made by the parliamentary majority” – where the 
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ruling government has control over neither the agenda nor triggering of the referendum (Vatter 
and Bernauer 2009, 338).  Small minorities of either voters or political elites trigger each of these 
forms of referendum.  Between high and low levels of governmental control are mandatory 
referendums, referendums required by a nation’s constitution for certain decisions, and allows 
the ruling government to “control the agenda… [but] it does not have much control over its 
initiation” (Ibid.). 
Though the conditions by which referendums are triggered are important, the conditions 
of passage and failure are equally important, as Vatter describes: 
In order to achieve a more accurate taxonomy of the numerous forms of direct 
democracy, we need to ask not only who initiates the referendum, but also who 
has ultimate decision-making authority. So far, we have considered the potential 
influence of governmental majority and non-governmental minorities only in 
terms of the initial stages of the decision-making process. We therefore need to 
continue by considering the rights of majorities and minorities during the final 
decision phase. … [Considering] the substantial difference between referendum 
decisions requiring qualified majorities, and those which can proceed on the basis 
of a simple majority. (2009, 129) 
 
Consequently, plebiscites and mandatory referendums are seen as a majoritarian device, 
because “minorities are excluded from their initiation and belong to the ‘losers’ in the absolute 
sense, after decisions have been made” (Vatter 2000, 174).  On the other hand, optional 
referendums, popular initiatives, and other referendums with low levels of government control 
are seen as a consensus-oriented device, “launched from the bottom-up by a small minority of 
voters or parliamentarians” for the purpose of either overturning decisions made by a legislative 
body or to circumvent a legislative body altogether (in the case of popular initiatives) (Marxer 
and Pállinger 2009, Vatter, 2009, 128).  In these situations, when the referendum is combined 
with the popular initiative, the referendum loses its “blunt majoritarian character” and becomes a 
consensus-oriented tool (Lijphart 2012, 221). 
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As an additional precaution, regardless of the level of governmental control, provisions 
for referendums often qualify the majority needed for passage, which helps mitigate the risk of 
“potentially tyrannical policy outcomes favored only by a slim majority of the voters (i.e., 50 
percent plus one)” (Lewis 2012, 2).  These qualifications can take a number of forms, ranging 
from ‘double majority’ rules – requiring a majority of voters in a majority of regions (such as 
states or districts) – to turnout requirements or majorities greater than a simple majority of 50 
percent (Vatter 2009). 
When the decision rules are taken into account with the level of governmental control, 
referendums can be classified into a “Majoritarian-Consensus” taxonomy (Vatter 2009, 130).  As 
shown in Figure 3, this taxonomy helps assess the majoritarian and consensus characteristics of 
various types of referendums – referendums located in the upper left of the table (i.e., high 
governmental control with a simple majority decision rule) are the most majoritarian, while 
referendums in the lower right (i.e., low governmental control with a qualified majority decision 
rule) are the most consensus-based. 
 
Figure 3: Vatter’s taxonomy of referendums 
Decision rule 
Governmental control 
Government-
initiated (high 
control) 
Constitutionally 
required (medium 
control) 
Initiated by a minority of 
voters or MP (low control) 
Simple majority 
Plebiscite (e.g. 
UK, France) 
Mandatory referendum 
(e.g. Spain, Austria) 
 
Optional referendum (e.g. 
Denmark) 
Simple majority 
and quorum of 
participation 
Plebiscite (e.g. 
Netherlands) 
Mandatory referendum 
(e.g. Ireland, Denmark) 
Optional (e.g. Sweden) and 
abrogative referendum 
(e.g. Italy) 
 
Qualified 
majority 
No example Mandatory referendum 
(e.g. Australia, 
Switzerland) 
Optional referendum and 
popular initiative (e.g. 
Switzerland) 
Source: Vatter (2009, 130) 
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Categorizing a referendum based on the governmental control and the majority needed to 
pass it is only one approach, however.  The justifications political elites have for supporting 
referendums can be grouped into three categories, which can be used to categorize referendums.  
As described by Gideon Rahat, the first category is avoidance, where a referendum is used as a 
method “to transform decision making and avoid the blame and responsibility for its outcome” 
(2009, 102).  Alternatively, avoidance can be used “when a party attempts to address voters who 
generally tend to favour… a particular policy that does not fit its own position, the party may try 
to neutralize this problem by promising to conduct a referendum” (Ibid.).  The second category 
of justification is addition, where elites conduct a referendum despite having the majority (or 
majorities) necessary, in order to “further legitimize a decision,” or to empower the enacting 
party (Ibid.).  Legitimization of an issue or policy by voters is perhaps the most common 
reasoning to enact a referendum across Europe (Hobolt 2012; Kissane 2009; Qvortrup 2014).  
Rahat’s third category is contradiction, where a referendum is used to contradict decisions made 
in other forums, with either a promotional – promoting a rejected policy – or a protective – 
preserving the status quo – intent (2009, 103).  It should be noted that these three categories are 
not exclusive of each other; a referendum may exist within more than one category.  A notable 
example of this is the 1975 UK referendum on membership in the European Community, where 
although a majority of Labour Party supported membership, a referendum was called to avoid 
intra-party conflict and legitimize the decision on membership.  Furthermore, the anti-EC 
minority of the Labour Party supported the referendum in the hope voters would override the 
majority vote from Parliament (Rahat 2009, 103). 
One of the goals of a referendum is to give citizens greater influence in the democratic 
process.  Referendums can be seen in the context of a growing trend of populism across Europe.  
  13 
Although referendums and other direct democratic institutions are not inherently ‘populist’ (at 
least in the sense that populism is defined for this paper), populist groups have increasingly 
employed referendums to advance their political goals.  Bjørklund situates the increased use of 
direct democracy since the 1970s as part of a larger trend of challenging political elites, 
particularly through voter-driven referendums, which fits into the populist narrative (2009).  
Direct input from voters has been viewed as a way to “improve the quality of policy-making,” by 
allowing the people to hold what is effectively a veto over decisions made by parliaments (Funk 
and Gathmann 2013, 300, Kissane 2009).  Furthermore, voters’ initiative referendums allow for 
a relatively small number of citizens to wield a large amount of power.  At the EU level, the ECI 
requires petitions with at least one million signatures (coming from at least seven member states) 
to be heard by the European Parliament.  Kaufmann notes that one million signatures represents 
merely 0.2 percent of all EU citizens, which can be seen as an excellent opportunity for citizens 
to have their voices heard, although he also observes that the ECI does not necessarily mean 
legislation will be proposed in the European Parliament, nor does it necessarily trigger a popular 
vote on the issue (2012).  Referendums can also be used to give minority groups – including 
political, ethnic or cultural minority groups, amongst many others – a greater influence in 
political systems, at both national and supranational levels.  This can be seen within the 
frameworks described above, as minority political groups can use referendums in an attempt to 
block legislation, and interest groups representing minority voters can initiate referendums to 
influence their social and political position, although Schiller notes that direct democracy 
represents “only a small part” of factors that can change this influence (2012, 45). 
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Referendums and Deliberative Democracy 
The surge in the use of referendums has led to tension between the principles of direct 
and deliberative democracy.  Although the two systems are not necessarily in conflict with each 
other, the nature of referendums – which place an emphasis on votes – can put them in conflict 
with deliberative democratic techniques and institutions – which place emphasis on ‘voice’ 
(LeDuc 2015).  Deliberative democracy is a theory that promotes public discussion, based on 
“mutual justification of political arguments,” as a central element of democracy, in order to 
overcome some of the problems of majoritarian democracy (Setälä 2009).  Deliberative 
democracy has been successfully promoted through institutions known as “mini-publics,” which 
are small representative groups of ordinary citizens (Goodin and Dryzek 2006). 
Lawrence LeDuc discusses the relationship between referendums and deliberative 
democracy extensively and identifies four areas that the two theories come into conflict:  politics, 
clarity, information, and participation (2015).  Since governments are typically the entities that 
trigger referendums, and governments rarely trigger referendums without the expectation of 
winning, the referendum campaign takes on an inherently political character.  Whether or not a 
referendum campaign takes place during an election campaign is also affects the deliberative 
nature of the campaign; the quality of deliberation is improved when there are not simultaneous 
campaigns.  LeDuc also observes that politics additionally influence deliberation when it comes 
to referendums in ways that have been outlined earlier in this paper, as a result of internal 
divisions in parties and second-order effects (2015).  The clarity of the referendum question also 
has an impact on how much deliberation is able to occur in a debate.  Although the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums states that 
referendum questions should be clear, and simple enough to answer “solely by yes, no or a blank 
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vote,” there is an element of subjectivity to definition of ‘clear,’ and overly complex referendum 
issues can result in voters using “short cuts” in establishing a position, impeding the deliberative 
process (2007, LeDuc, 2015).  Another area where direct and deliberative democracy can 
conflict, information, has some similarities with the above issues of clarity.  In post-referendum 
polls, voters often report that they felt that they were not well informed enough about the issue.  
This has been an especially salient problem in referendums on complex proposals, such as 
European treaties or constitutions, and feeds into the issue of voter short cuts and problems of 
clarity.  Information can also impact deliberation when referendum campaigns make use of 
negative campaigning or disinformation, “particularly in a short campaign involving an issue on 
which there has been little prior deliberation”, since “genuinely deliberative democracy requires 
that all arguments be heard equally” (LeDuc 2015, 145).  The final area where direct and 
deliberative democracy can conflict is participation.  Turnout is likely the most significant 
participation-based issue, and although some issues surrounding turnout have already been 
discussed in this paper, LeDuc makes two points regarding turnout not already discussed in this 
paper: first, he argues that a minimum amount of participation is needed for deliberation, and 
that turnout is directly connected to the legitimacy of the referendum; LeDuc also observes that 
turnout quotas have been used in some referendums as a method to achieve this minimum 
participation, but stresses that high voter turnout is not necessarily the same thing as engagement 
and deliberation.  Secondly, he notes that turnout and participation are not issues that should be 
considered in a vacuum, and that they are directly influenced by the other factors previously 
discussed, such as the nature of the campaign, information levels, and politics. 
Proponents of both direct and deliberative democracy are able to find common ground in 
the belief that one of the flaws in modern representative democracies is that citizens “lack 
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competence and a sense of political responsibility” (Setälä 2009, 3).  In order to solve this lack of 
competency, each group advocates that competency can be improved if the public is given a 
greater role in governance.  The two groups have differences in the role that people should hold, 
however.  Direct democracy advocates argue that the public should hold greater power in 
decision-making, particularly through referendums, while advocates for deliberative democracy 
argue that greater public deliberation is a preferred way to make the people more competent. But 
as referenced earlier, and as Goodin and Dryzek show, direct democracy and deliberative 
democracy are not mutually exclusive practices (2006). 
 
Voter Choice in Referendums 
Proponents of direct democratic initiatives argue that voters are competent, should be 
trusted to directly make decisions and that doing so would enhance civic education and 
awareness (Cronin 1989).  Conversely, critics of direct democracy state that voters are not 
properly motivated to reflect deeply on political issues, and thus referendums do not lead to 
effective participation or outcomes (Setälä 2009).  Public support for referendums is high, and 
correspondingly, the number of referendums is increasing, victories for those who support direct 
democracy (Schuck and de Vreese 2015).  However, voting patterns and the manner in which 
referendum campaigns are conducted seem to indicate that concerns of some critics may be 
manifesting themselves in the run up to and aftermath of referendums. 
One of the core issues of direct democracy is the idea that voters are competent enough to 
make decisions in referendum voting.  There has been significant growth in the use of 
referendums since the 1970s.  Bjørklund links this growth in referendums to the emergence of 
the New Politics approach, introduced in the 1970s, which asserted that rising educational levels 
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and expanding mass media led to increased political skills, while simultaneously, new political 
issues, “such as environmentalism, lifestyle questions, and immigration” has contributed to a 
trend of voter de-alignment, as increasing numbers of individuals “felt competent to make their 
political decisions independently of cues from political parties” (2009, 121-122).  An additional 
consequence of the emergence of the New Politics approach has been an increase in single-issue 
voters; subsequently, despite having greater access to information regarding issues, voters have 
become more detached from the larger context of political issues, to the detriment of political 
deliberation. 
The increased role of mass media and the growth of single-issue voters have had 
significant influence in referendum campaign tactics.  Media outlets play a role in disseminating 
information, and therefore also play a role in influencing the outcome of a referendum vote.  
Marcinkowski suggests that the media, along with campaign groups, can influence the outcome 
of a vote, by changing the way they interpret and highlight an issue (2007).  As a result of this, 
the focus and context of referendum campaigns can evolve beyond the original issue that a 
political party or group originally intended.  Furthermore, owing to the very nature of a 
referendum, voters typically eschew party preference during referendum campaigns – Font and 
Rodríguez note that a referendum where voters exclusively follow party preference would be 
“wasted” – although the extent to which this is the case is dependent on a number of factors 
surrounding the context of the referendum itself (2009, 168, LeDuc, 2015).  Referendum 
campaigns can also exacerbate splits within parties, with members of a single party working to 
campaign for opposite sides of the issue.  LeDuc, however, says that this is not necessarily 
negative, as he argues that referendums are best debated in an arena as free from partisanship as 
possible, and that while government neutrality is preferable, division within parties is still 
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beneficial as it allows more voices to enter the conversation and shifts focus towards the issue 
that the referendum is attempting to address (2015). 
Complete government neutrality is not a likely scenario in any referendum campaign, and 
political parties almost always take a public stance in the run-up to the vote.  Sara Hobolt shows 
that party stances can have a considerable, albeit indirect, impact on voting behavior in 
referendum campaigns, demonstrating that voters take cues from the parties they support when 
voting on a policy issue and acting as “pivotal information providers,” although it should be 
noted that voters also take cues from the media and other elites (2006, 642).  Party stances are far 
from the only factor influencing the development of voters’ opinions, however, and only in 
situations where campaigns reinforce previously held opinions do party affiliations play a 
significant role; discussions and discourse during the campaign play a larger role when 
referendum concerns an issue that is unfamiliar to voters (LeDuc 2009).  Furthermore, 
referendum campaigns often focus their efforts not on voters who have strong opinions of one 
party or side of the issue, but instead on ‘undecided’ voters.  The attempt to simplify complicated 
political issues into a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer can lead to voters feeling as if they do not have 
enough information to properly make a decision, which can lead to an inherent advantage to the 
‘no’ side, particularly if it represents maintenance of the status quo (LeDuc 2009). 
There is also significant debate over whether or not voter choices in EU referendums 
represent ‘issue-voting’ or ‘second-order’ voting (Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005).  The issue-
voting approach hypothesizes that voter choice in EU referendums is driven by voters’ views on 
the EU or on the EU issue being voted on.  By contrast, the second-order approach hypothesizes 
that voters are less concerned about issues at stake in the referendum question, and instead use 
their vote in that contest to signal their support – or lack thereof – for the national government 
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currently in power.  Garry, Marsh and Sinnott find that voter choices in the EU primarily follow 
the issue-voting hypothesis, although the level of satisfaction with the ruling government does 
play a smaller role (2005). 
Voter choice in referendums is influenced by a myriad of factors not already discussed, 
including anti-establishment rhetoric, party division, ideological division, segmentation of issues, 
altered campaign discourse, and turnout (LeDuc 2009).  Turnout is a factor worth noting, as 
turnout in referendums tends to be lower than in general elections but has been shown to 
fluctuate significantly in different referendums. Additionally, the results of referendums can be 
influenced by seemingly insignificant factors; Matsusaka demonstrates that in the United States, 
ballot order and length can have an effect on the outcome of referendums:  although the location 
at which a ballot proposition only has a marginal effect on the outcome, ballot length can have a 
much more significant impact on results (2016).  Other factors have been implicated in 
undesirable referendum outcomes, such as the weather – in the case of Colombia’s referendum 
on a peace deal with the FARC military group (Taub and Fisher 2016).  It is worth stating that 
none of these factors should be considered in a vacuum; the results of any given referendum 
result from an interaction of these and other factors unique to that particular issue, and it is not 
possible to determine and quantify all of the influences on voter choice in a particular 
referendum. 
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CASE STUDY: BALLOT INITIATIVES IN CALIFORNIA 
The California ballot initiative system dates back to 1911, when an amendment to the 
state constitution creating a ballot initiative system was approved, giving Californians “a 
powerful tool to bypass the Legislature and Governor” (Bowen 2011, 253).  The movement to 
approve a ballot initiative system stemmed from a desire to “seize control of a government 
perceived to be under control of excessive corporate influences,” namely the Southern Pacific 
Railroad (Braunstein 2004, 26).  The amendment approved included four primary institutions, as 
detailed by Lee: 
(1) initiative constitutional amendments proposed by popular petition and 
submitted to the voters; (2) the direct statutory initiative, statutes proposed by 
petition and submitted to the voters; (3) the indirect statutory initiative, statutes 
proposed by petition, submitted to the legislature and, failing of passage by that 
body, to the electorate (repealed in 1966); and (4) the referendum, the suspension 
of the enforcement of a law until it has been referred to the voters and approved 
by them. (1979, 69-70) 
 
Since its creation in 1911, California’s ballot initiative system has become the gold 
standard across the country, with greater use of initiatives and referendums than any other state 
between 1964 and 2000 (Braunstein 2004).  Between 1912 and 2016, 1,952 petitions for ballot 
initiatives were circulated, of which 19 percent (376) qualified for the ballot.  Of the proportion 
of petitions that were approved for the ballot, 35 percent (132) were approved by voters and 
became law.3  Though some initiatives were passed the first time they appeared on the ballot, 
                                               
3A full summary of ballot initiative totals is available at: http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-
measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf  
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others, with issues ranging from taxes to women’s rights, have been voted down and requalified 
for the ballot multiple times before ultimately being approved by voters (Bowen 2011). 
According to the 2017 Statewide Initiative Guide published by the California Secretary of 
State, the state constitution outlines a specific procedure that must be followed for an initiative to 
qualify for the ballot.  First, a petitioner must draft the text of the proposed law, submit it to the 
state Attorney General and pay a $2000 deposit.  For the most part, “any matter that is a proper 
subject of legislation can become an initiative measure,” but each initiative must address only 
one issue (California Secretary of State 2016, i).  After being certified by the Secretary of State, 
petitions must be circulated around the state and a specified number of signatures from registered 
voters be collected, totaling 5 percent of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election for 
statute initiatives, or 8 percent for constitutional amendment initiatives.  Upon collection of the 
required number of signatures, the initiative is considered “eligible” for the ballot, and after 
verification of those signatures, the Secretary of State certifies that the initiative has qualified for 
the ballot.  The initiative will then be placed on the ballot during the next statewide general 
election, and if approved by a simple majority of voters (i.e., 50 percent plus one), the initiative 
becomes law the day after the election. 
The ballot initiative and referendum system in California has produced a great diversity 
of legislative proposals.  While most have dealt with relatively mundane issues from across the 
political spectrum, initiatives have given proponents of issues from outside the mainstream, such 
as environmentalists, an opportunity to make their case to the public (Cronin 1989).  More 
recently, the ballot initiative system has been used to push for the legalization of marijuana in 
California: first in 1972, then 2010, when Proposition 19, “Dubbed the “highest-profile” ballot 
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legislation in the country,” received 46.5 percent of the vote, and again in 2016, when 57 percent 
of voters voted in favor of legalization (Biggers 2014, 3, McGreevy 2016). 
Additionally, though they are relatively rare, numerous controversial and discriminatory 
initiatives have been approved through the system: in 1920 voters approved an initiative that 
“prohibited ownership of land by corporations controlled by persons ineligible for 
naturalization,” a proposal targeted at the state’s growing Japanese agricultural communities 
(Cronin 1989, 93).  Moreover, controversial initiatives continue to appear on California ballots:  
as HoSang details, despite the state’s reputation as one of the most liberal in the country, during 
the 1990s several controversial initiatives were passed by California voters, “banning public 
education and public services for many immigrants (1994), repealing affirmative action 
programs (1996), outlawing bilingual education (1998), and toughening criminal sentencing for 
adults and juveniles (1994, 2000)” (2010, 11). 
Despite the fact that California’s initiative system has allowed numerous controversial 
and, at times discriminatory, proposals to become law, other checks and balances that 
characterize the American political system remain.  Lee points out that “From 1960 through 
1976, only two of the seven constitutional initiative measures approved in California were not 
struck down by the courts, in whole or in part” (1979, 74).   
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CASE STUDY: REFERENDUMS IN THE UK 
In contrast with the robust direct democratic institutions found in the state of California, 
the UK lacks a codified, systematic procedure for holding referendums.  Despite this, since the 
1970s “Referendums have become part of the constitutional tapestry” in the British electoral 
system, gaining popularity at multiple levels of government throughout the country to settle 
questions ranging from devolution of powers to regional parliaments, constitutional reform, and 
local taxation (Qvortrup 2006, 59).  Additionally, beginning with Harold Wilson’s referendum 
on European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 1975, British political leaders have 
utilized the referendum in relation to issues regarding European integration, often at the behest of 
“those who sought to prevent or limit British involvement with Europe,” culminating with the 
Brexit vote in June of 2016 (Bogdanor 2005, 694, S. B. Hobolt 2016). 
In addition to their use in settling issues regarding the EU, British politicians have 
increasingly used referendums when addressing changes to the UK’s unwritten constitution.  As 
a “prototypical” example of Lijphart’s majoritarian model of democracy, the UK’s constitution is 
not a single written and codified document, but instead utilizes a “series of statutes, laws and 
norms that developed over centuries in an evolutionary fashion” (Cotton and Fontana 2018, 3-4).  
This institutional setup, combined with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty that is central 
to the Westminster model of government fosters an environment that is permissive for 
substantial constitutional change (Ibid.).  Though the British government is not legally obligated 
to call a referendum when making changes to the basic statutes underpinning British law, “a vote 
in Parliament is no longer sufficient to secure legitimacy” when making these changes 
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(Bogdanor 2001, 145).  As a result, since 1997 referendums have become the norm when British 
political leaders wish to make changes to the country’s basic statues, particularly in regards to 
electoral reforms, which are now expected to “be preceded by a referendum”  (Qvortrup 2012, 
108, Strohmeier 2015).  Former Prime Minister Tony Blair is largely responsible for the shift 
from referendums only being called to address “unique and exceptional” issues like membership 
in the European Community to addressing issues such as constitutional reform (Bogdanor 2001, 
144); in 1996 he argued that referendums could be used “to give citizens a veto over proposals to 
change their system of government, and to give legitimacy to the changes to which they do 
agree” (55). 
As a part of the aforementioned changes to the unwritten constitution, proposals for the 
devolution of powers from the unitary parliament in Westminster to regional parliaments in 
London, North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have been an issue where referendums have been 
consistently used in the UK (Qvortrup 2006).  The first pair of such referendums – on the 
devolution of power to regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales – occurred in 1979, and both 
were defeated (Ibid.).  These referendums, along with later (successful) devolution referendums 
during the 1990s were part of the Labour Party’s – the only party to make use of referendums 
until the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum – electoral strategy, designed to help ensure power in 
Westminster, quell rising support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), and reduce intra-party 
disagreement over the topic of devolution (Cotton and Fontana 2018, Qvortrup 2006). 
Because Britain lacks an initiative procedure, Parliament sets the conditions required for 
all referendums to pass (in addition to the wording of the ballot text).  In many cases, including 
for the 2016 Brexit vote, a simple majority with no turnout requirement has been the only 
condition of passage; however, in some situations further conditions have been stipulated:  for 
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instance, both the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum and 1979 Scotland referendums required 
that a majority representing 40 percent of the total electorate vote ‘yes’ was necessary for the 
referendum to pass (Cotton and Fontana 2018, Qvortrup, 2006, Qvortrup, 2012). 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
When comparing the direct democratic institutions of California and the UK, one of the 
most substantial differences between the two systems is the legal background in each case.  In 
California, the procedure for calling a referendum or placing an initiative on the ballot is 
prescribed by the state constitution.  In line with the American system of government, the 
California state constitution exists as a unified formal document that requires relatively 
exceptional circumstances to change – a feature typical of Lijphart’s consensus democracy 
(Braunstein 2004).  Contrasting with this is the British system, which has an informal, unwritten 
constitution and does not prescribe a specific procedure for referendums.  As a result, any direct 
democratic measures must be authorized by Parliament, giving political minorities little 
opportunity to fight for change. 
Direct democratic institutions in California and the UK represent two opposing sides of 
Vatter and Bernauer’s taxonomy of referendums (2009).  While the California system, where “a 
small minority of voters” has the power to propose an initiative, is representative of low 
governmental control, referendums in the UK, which can only be called by “the ruling majority” 
are a typical example of direct democracy with a high level of governmental control (Ibid., 338).  
In this regard, British referendums have served as a majoritarian device, while Californian 
initiatives function to foster consensus. 
Although they differ in the level of governmental control, the institutions in both cases 
generally utilize the same decision rule of a simple majority, a characteristic typically associated 
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with referendums that have majoritarian features (Vatter 2009).  In California, however, judicial 
review of statutes passed through the ballot initiative system serves to filter out at least some 
referendums that might be discriminatory and is considered by Lijphart to be characteristic of 
consensus-based democracy (Cronin 1989, Lijphart 2012).  Though California’s ballot initiatives 
have a number of consensual characteristics, the state’s optional referendums, approved by the 
state legislature and requiring a simple majority of voters to pass, are substantially more 
majoritarian in nature.  Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there have been situations where 
British referendums have included a turnout requirement – a decision more closely linked to 
consensus-based features – but these referendums do not represent what is typical in the British 
case (Qvortrup 2006). 
Considering the institutional features of direct democracy in California and the UK in the 
context of Lijphart’s two dimensions of democracy, while there are a number of connections 
between these institutions and the federal-unitary dimension, there are few connections between 
the institutions and the executives-parties dimension.  The cases presented show that there can be 
direct impacts on four of the five variables within the federal-unitary dimension: 1) the federal 
unitary variable, 2) the unicameralism-bicameralism variable, 3) the constitutional amendment 
variable, and 4) the legislative supremacy variable.  By contrast, these institutional features 
discussed here have little, if any impact on any of the variables along the executives-parties 
dimension.  Consequently, this suggests that, in line with Vatter and Bernauer’s (2009) 
argument, proper analysis of the majoritarian or consensual impact of direct democratic 
institutions requires treating those institutions as a third dimension of Lijphart’s analysis. 
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Despite their typological differences, the two direct democratic systems share referendum 
campaign characteristics also seen in other systems of government that utilize direct democratic 
institutions.  In both cases, voter choice is a concern, albeit for different reasons. 
In California, there has been substantial research that suggests that “campaign spending is 
the best predictor of the success of ballot measures,” giving individuals and groups with greater 
financial resources a substantial advantage through the entire initiative process from start to 
finish (Braunstein 2004, 75).  Bowen highlights this discrepancy, noting that “while some 
initiatives qualify for statewide ballot through heroic grassroots efforts, others are funded almost 
entirely by a single well-heeled business or individual,” as tactics like paid signature-gatherers 
are used in order to help proposals qualify for the ballot (2011, 254, Braunstein 2004).  This 
discrepancy continues into the campaign, where groups with greater financial resources have 
greater agenda-setting ability, influencing the debate for or against a proposal and reducing the 
ability for neutral deliberation during the campaign (LeDuc 2015). 
Although the UK’s direct democratic institutions do not leave an opportunity for well-
financed interest groups to propose initiatives directly, voters’ choices during referendum 
campaigns can be impacted by outside groups in much the same way as in California.  
Additionally, since referendums in the UK have a high level of government control and are 
closely linked to the ruling party in Parliament, the second-order voting effects may come into 
play.  Hobolt points out that during and after the Brexit referendum campaign, a “key argument 
for Leave voters is lack of trust in David Cameron and his government” (2016, 1263).  
Additionally, second-order effects may have an influence on agenda-setting, as the support of a 
popular or trusted politician may help normalize positions that were otherwise outside of the 
political mainstream (Crum 2007, S. B. Hobolt 2006). 
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Conclusion 
After several high-profile referendums in recent years, the role of direct democracy in 
representative democratic systems has come under increased scrutiny.  California and the UK, 
two systems with markedly different direct democratic institutions were selected as case studies 
to explore the how Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensual models of democracy are impacted by 
direct democracy (2012).  In each system, the institutions had both majoritarian and consensual 
features, though the British system of government – a prototype of the majoritarian democracy – 
tended to have fewer consensual and anti-majoritarian features.  The presence of referendums did 
have an impact on the political process in both cases, however the mixed majoritarian and 
consensual features in the two systems lends support to Vatter and Bernauer’s suggestion that 
referendums may in fact function as a third dimension of democracy (2009). 
In both cases, the direct democratic institutions created opportunities for negative impacts 
on the deliberative democratic process.  Although the circumstances are somewhat different, 
voter choice is an issue in both cases, as referendum campaigns give an opportunity for interest 
groups to use financial resources to alter the tone of the campaign and influence the debate 
before the vote.  Furthermore, in the case of California, interest groups or individuals with 
significant financial resources can utilize the ballot initiative system to circumvent the state 
legislature and place proposals directly on the ballot.  Meanwhile, in the UK, second-order 
voting can impact the results of referendums, with the side of the issue supported by more 
popular and trusted politicians or parties performing better than side supported by less popular 
and trusted politicians or parties. 
Though referendums do increase political engagement and citizen satisfaction with 
democracy, they do not necessarily represent a flawless or ideal form of government (Biggers 
  30 
2014, Bernauer and Vatter 2012).  The topics discussed here could be researched further by 
expanding the scope of case studies used.  The inclusion of the UK as a case study presented 
limitations to the conclusions drawn, as the country makes very limited use of direct democracy 
in the policymaking process.  The addition of a case like Switzerland, which represents a more 
purely consensual democracy according to Lijphart’s taxonomy, in addition to utilizing 
referendums that fit in Vatter and Bernauer’s category of medium governmental control, would 
allow for more robust conclusions to be drawn from these comparisons.  Additionally, further 
study of the design of various direct democratic institutions and its connections with majoritarian 
and consensual democracy can be explored, along with a more focused analysis of various 
aspects of voter behavior before and after the inclusions of direct democratic institutions in order 
to better assess the impact that these institutions can have on voters. 
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